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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A STUDY ON BUSINESS INCUBATOR 
 MODELS IN THE U.S AND KOREA 
 
 
By 
 
Boyun Yun 
 
 
 Business incubators in the New Economy are seen as entities that help to create 
successful new ventures by providing speed-to-market, synergy, network, talent, and 
capital. This study examines the business models of various business incubators and 
analyzes the case of three early movers: Idealab, CMGI, and ICG. These incubator 
business models are classified by organization type and operating type. Even though 
each business model has different value focus, this study analyzes the overall value 
proposition and risks of business incubators and identifies some of the key factors for 
success.  
 This study also examines the current status of business 
incubators in Korea and offers some suggestions for improvement 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 During the past few months, the number of for-profit business incubators has 
increased dramatically both in the U.S and in Korea. In the past, business and 
technology incubators were tools for rehabilitating local economies or improving 
technological  innovations within a country. These incubators were sponsored by 
non-profit organizations such as local communities, governments, universities, and 
the like. Since the late 1990s, however, the incubator concept has gained popularity 
with Internet and high-technology related businesses because it addresses the unique 
demands required of successful ventures capital firms. Increasingly shorter times to 
IPO’s as well as faster speed-to-market (which involve powerful capital and human 
resources synergy effects) have made the incubator business model attractive. 
Some early movers such as Idealab, CMGI, and ICG recorded remarkable 
returns from selling or bringing public their portfolio firms. Their phenomenal 
growth has spawned others to act and Korea has been no different. The rapid 
expansion of such incubators has been facilitated by KOSDAQ and grew explosively   
since the mid-1999 with the advent of venture industries.  
 
 The scope of this study is focused on for-profit business incubators, which 
excludes non-profit incubators. 
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 This study focuses on the business models of US incubators and examines 
the following issues: 
 
Ø  Identify the various business models of such incubators  
Ø  Classify  business models according to various characteristics  
Ø Analyze the value proposition, risks and key success factors of each business 
incubator model 
   
 This study also explores the Korean incubator industry and makes 
comparisons to US models. Through this process the surrounding business 
environments will be analyzed and implications for Korean incubators will be 
discussed. 
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Chapter II 
OVERVIEW OF NEW BUSINESS INCUBATORS 
 
 
I. Recent Growth Phenomenon 
 
Business incubators have been around since 1959, when Charles Mancuso 
and his family purchased 850,000 square feet of a multi-story factory warehouse and 
leased it to several tenants in Batavia, N.Y.Mancuso partitioned the space and 
allowed tenants to share various office service expenses1. This building, which is 
known as the Batavia Industrial Center (BIC) has been instrumental in the creation 
of more than 1,000 businesses.2Many communities adopted and developed this idea 
to revitalize the ir local economies and to create jobs by providing entrepreneurs with 
a breeding ground to develop new firms. During the 1970s, business incubators 
became a tool for improving regional and national competitiveness by fostering the 
emergence of innovative and technology-based firms. This shift was accelerated in 
the 1980s by linking the incubator concept more closely to higher education and 
public research institutions. In the 1990s, there has been a trend to develop business 
incubators around specific industrial and technological clusters such as 
biotechnology, information technology, and environment technologies.3 
 According to the U.S. National Business Incubation Association (NBIA), 
there are more than 800 business incubators in North America – a dramatic rise from 
12 in 1980. Currently 75 percent of North American incubators are nonprofit, while 
                                                                 
1 Frederick Burger, “Business Incubators: How Successful Are They?,” Area Development, Jan. 1999. 
2 Lawrence Aragon and Julie Landry, “How a Farming Town Hatched a New Way of Doing 
Business,” Red Herring,19 Jan. 2000. 
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25 percent are profit orientated. For-profit incubators were only 8 percent of the total 
587 incubators in a 1998 survey. 
 The recent growth of for-profit incubators implies not only the growth in the 
number of firms, but also the emergence of new breeds  of incubators. Many people 
argue that the new incubators were started by Bill Gross of Idealab in 1996. In 
contrast to the older and more static concept which had rent or client fees as a main 
revenue source4, Idealab had considerable equity stake in the incubated firms and 
provided a whole set of business support resources from idea generation to operation 
and funding. This highly efficient hatchery concept makes for a particularly nice fit 
in the New Economy, where time and talent are often the most precious 
resources.5According to NBIA, for-profit incubators recently began opening at the 
rate of nearly four firms per week. 
 
 
II. Definition 
 
The NBIA published the following definition of a business incubator: 
“Business incubators accelerate the successful development of 
entrepreneurial companies through an array of business support resources and 
services, developed or orchestrated by incubator management, and offered both in 
the incubator and through its network of contacts.” 
The 1995 NBIA survey illustrates the features of old-style business 
incubators. 57 percent of revenues came from rent or client fees, 21 percent from 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
3 OECD Secretariat, “Building Business and Technology Incubators”, Technology Incubators: 
Nurturing Small Firms, OECD, 1997, 13-32. 
4 As Note 3. 
5 G.Beato, “Dream Factory,” Business 2.0, December 1999. 
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service contracts or grants, and 31 percent from cash subsidies of government or 
communities. 59 percent of firms served by incubation programs are “regular 
clients” (start-up firms in the facility), 34 percent are “affiliate firms” (firms that 
access services but are located off-site) and 7 percent are “anchor firms” (firms that 
are self-sufficient and are either graduates or remain in the facility adding stability to 
the incubators). 6  
 Recent  for-profit business incubators, however, have many different aspects. 
Internet and technology are the main focus of incubating, and instead of fees for 
their services, equity stake has become an important compensation method. New 
incubators have various different operating models and services. The following 
definitions in some studies on new incubators reflect the different features of new 
incubators. 
 Motley Fool Internet reports states the following definition:  
 “ A firm that helps other start-up companies grow in the early stages of its 
lifecycle in exchange for a share of the success of the child company”7 
 A paper on incubators of MBA program at MIT states an incubator as 
follows 
 “A controlled environment that fosters the care, growth, and protection of a 
new venture at an early stage before it is ready for traditional means of self-
sustaining operation. In today’s world, where information technology and the 
Internet are normal parts of the business environment , the term “controlled 
                                                                 
6 OECD Secretariat, “Building Business and Technology Incubators”, Technology Incubators: 
Nurturing Small Firms, OECD, 1997, 13-32.  
7 Paul Larson, “Internet Incubators Nurture Fledgling Companies,” Motley Fool Research, 9 May 
2000. 
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environment” could be either physical (real estate and office facilities) or virtual 
(networks)”8 
From the many definitions of business incubators, two  distinctive features of 
these recently evolved for-profit incubators may be noted; firstly that virtual 
incubators – click versus brick and mortar – have become popular , and secondly that 
equity is the major compensation method for services provided. 
These features are more specifically explored in the following chapter 
 
III. Business Models 
 
1. Overall Survey 
 
Several surveys were conducted or are being conducted about incubator 
business models. Among them, a few comprehensive survey data was available at 
the time of preparing this study: 1) Oonnut Mac Chinsombon, “Incubators in the new 
economy” MBA at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (June 2000) – 52 US 
incubators survey, 2) Morten T. Hansen, Nitin Nohria, and Jeffrey A. Berger, “The 
State of the Incubator Marketplace”, Harvard Business School(June 2000) – 169 US 
incubators survey, 3) Joanne Lee, Christina Ma, Patrick Maloney, Victoria Martens , 
Oswaldo Ramirez “Business Incubators: US vs. Europe” Hass School of Business 
(June 2000) – 69 incubators in the U.S and Europe.  
 
Here are some common features of the incubator model which have been 
extracted from several surveys conducted recently. 
                                                                 
8 Oonnut Mac Chinsombon, Incubators in the New Economy, MBA Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, June 2000. 
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(1) Deal Sourcing  
 
According to Chinsombon in an MIT survey, 19% of incubators had some 
internal idea generation function. For external idea generation, the most common 
source of ideas and deals was personal and professional networks. Deals derived 
from the network of service firms and friends were more highly evaluated than those 
that came in without reference.9 Other deals originated from external submissions, 
web interfaces, university relationships, and business plan competitions.  
 
(2) Deal Evaluation 
 
Incubators have their own criteria for screening deals. The most common 
criteria for screening deals include  market needs, market size, level of market 
fragmentation, unique business model and potential for market leadership. 
Evaluating such criteria involves the following process: 1) Initial screening by one or 
more analyst 2) A committee review and market research 3) Entrepreneur 
presentation4) Due diligence and in-depth research, and5)contract formation10 
 
(3) Source of Inve stment Fund 
 
Sources of incubator funds include institutional investors, private individuals 
and publicly traded stocks as in the case of listed incubators.  
 
                                                                 
9 As Note 8. 
10As Note 8. 
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(4) Point of Intervention 
 
The literature on this subject revealed that incubators typically invest in the very 
early stage – seed stage – of firms. Figure 2-1 clearly illustrates this fact: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5) Amount of Investment 
 
The range of investments usually begin with between 50,000 to 500,000 and 
may extend upwards to a maximum of about 2 million USD.11  
 
(6) Equity Stake  
 
                                                                 
11 Joanne Lee, Christina Ma, Patrick Maloney, Victoria Martens, and Oswaldo Ramirez, Business 
Incubators: US vs. Europe, Hass School of Business, Univ. of California Berkley, June 2000.  
Figure 2-1Point of Intervention 
Percent of incubators 
Source: Chinsomboon, MIT 
concept seedearly midlate mezzanine pre-IPO 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
 9
 Hansen, Nohria and Berger note in a June 1990  Harvard Business School 
survey that the average equity stake held by incubators is 35%, but Chinsombon’s 
research revealed that equity stakes varied widely from 2% to 60%. 
 
(7) Participating Business Focus 
 
The Harvard Business School survey highlights that 92% of interviewed 
incubators answered that the Internet is their main focus. 
 
(8) Period of Incubation 
 
Not surprisingly, the time horizon varies according to the industry and goals 
of the firm: 6 to 18 months for high-tech software firms, 5 years for bio-tech firms, 
and 90 to 120 days for incubating projects that involve consulting 12. 
 
(9) Exiting  
 
 Exiting milestones are as follows. After additional rounds of funding by 
institutional investors, space constraints in physical incubators, or failure in meeting 
agreed upon terms13 . Sometimes the last one, ‘failure of agreed upon terms’ is 
blamed for a harsh terms of contract. For example, a Manhattan-based incubator 
insisted that its candidate firm to share its technology with other companies. The 
                                                                 
12Oonnut Mac Chinsombon, Incubators in the New Economy, MBA thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, June 2000. 
13 As Note 12. 
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entrepreneur refused and the incubator suggested the second offer: Raise up to $10 
million dollars in a year or lose the firm to the incubator14 
  
(10) Services Offered 
 
 Figure 2-2 describes the  services offered by incubators. The most common 
services are business development (100%), finance (98%) and strategy (87%). 
Business development includes assistance in evaluating, structuring, and negotiating 
joint ventures, strategic alliances, joint marketing agreement, acquisitions and other 
transactions. The Harvard Business School survey shows that nearly all incubators 
offer physical space and also picked funding and coaching as commonly offered 
services.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
14 Luisa Kroll, “Mad Hatchery Syndrome”, Forbes, 17 April2000. 
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(10) Location 
 
Figure 2-3 shows that incubators in the U.S. are centered in California and 
New York – areas where IT knowledge are concentrated. According to the survey  
by HBS, incubator locations are city centric16  
 
 
States Number of incubator % 
California 44 27% 
New York 19 12% 
Georgia 14 9% 
Massachusetts 13 8% 
Virginia 8 5% 
Others 66 40% 
Total 165 100% 
Source: www.rednecktech.com 
 
The business models of incubators have a wide range of variations. However they 
may be clearly distinguished from venture capital models. The following is a 
comparison between the two . 
 
Table 2 -2 Business Model Comparison Between Incubator and Venture Capital  
 Incubator Venture capital 
Stage of intervention Early stage Expansion stage 
Amount of funding USD 50,000 to2 million Average  
USD 13 million 
Way of delivering services Management position 
Board representation 
Board representation 
Services offered  Whole array of business 
support  
Mainly capital 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
15Morten T. Hansen, Nitin Nohria, and Jeffrey A. Berger, “The State of the Incubator Marketplace,” 
Harvard Business School, June 2000. 
16Morten T. Hansen, Nitin Nohria, and Jeffrey A. Berger, “The State of the Incubator Marketplace,” 
Harvard Business School, June 2000. 
Table2-1 Locations of US Incubators 
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2. Cases of Most Active Incubators: Idealab, ICG, CMGI 
 
The above survey reveal s the overall features of business incubators. Yet such 
general models cannot directly translate into current and upcoming successful 
incubator business models. Therefore this study examines the most active incubators. 
Given their short history, attempts to select successful ones is limited; the long-term 
prospects, for example, may prove quite different from short term results. Success of 
incubators can be measured several ways, such as : number of graduates, number of 
IPO’s, rate of return of its investment, success of graduates, net income, market value 
of equity stake held by incubators, and market value of incubator stocks, to name a 
few. Due to fluctuating market prices and their short history, however, the success of 
incubators cannot be measured statistically. Therefore this study analyzes incubators 
which have been noticed and regarded as key players by the press - Idealab, CMGI, 
and ICG (Internet Capital Group). 
 
Tables 2-3 and 2-4 compare and contrast these three leading incubators. 
Idealab is considered a first mover among new incubators while ICG and CMGI are 
also considered early movers. Some of the common features and differences are 
outlined . 
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Table 2-3 Summary of Business Model of Three Incubators  
 Idealab ICG CMGI 
Deal 
Sourcing 
Mostly internal idea 
through frequent 
brainstorming session 
External – through 
network sources 
External – through 
network sources, 
Internal 
Deal  
Evaluation 
Criteria 
Address a large, 
unidentified market 
needs 
Superior business model 
Scalable business model 
Sufficient entry barrier to 
benefit from first mover 
advantage 
Sustainable competitive 
advantage 
Value to idealab network 
Criteria 
Industry 
Inefficient market 
Potential-size, profit 
Existence of 
centralized 
information sources 
Company 
Industry leader 
potential 
Significant ownership 
Network synergy 
Management quality 
Criteria 
Industry leader potential 
Efficient business model 
Interconnectivity with 
CMGI network and 
synergy 
 
Focus B2C e-commerce and 
Internet infra, service 
B2B e-commerce and 
technology 
 
B2B, B2C  
e-commerce, technology  
Funding Affiliation of 5 venture 
funds 
 
Public market of ICG 
stock  
Public market of CMGI 
stock  
CMGI @Ventures fund 
Stage of 
intervention 
Mainly concept and seed 
stage 
Later stage of pre-IPO Concept, Early, Later 
stage, pre-IPO 
Equity stake  Over 50% - 8 firms 
 20-50%-11 firms 
 under 20% - 11 firms 
Over 50% - 8 firms 
 20-50%-53 firms 
 under 20% - 12 firms 
Over 50% - 17 firms 
 20-50%-4 firms 
 under 20% - 33 firms 
Services Office infra, Funding, 
Recruiting 
Business development 
Strategy, 
Technology 
Legal, Sales/marketing 
Funding, 
Recruiting 
Business development 
Strategy, 
Technology 
Legal, Sales/marketing 
Office infra, Funding, 
Recruiting 
Business development 
Strategy, 
Technology 
Legal, Sales/marketing 
Employees 198 70 1,024 
Asset $ 1,674,683,000 $ 2,050,384,000 $ 2,404,594,000 
Relation with 
incubated firms 
Considered as separate 
entity  
Networking firms through 
formal and informal 
communication 
Considered as separate 
entity  
Formal conference, 
meeting, 
Informal introduction 
Direct control of 
operating firms  
  
CEO 
background 
Bill Gross  
B.S.engineering 
Founded several ventures 
Walter Buckley 
B.S. political science 
Safeguard Scientifics 
Founded one venture  
David Wetherell 
B.A. mathematics 
Founded several ventures 
Origin Start –up by Bill Gross 
  
Co-founded by Walter 
Buckley and Ken Fox  
Former Safeguard 
Scientifics employee 
LBO of CMG(marketing 
firm) by Wetherell 
Location California (headquarter) 
Silicon Valley New York, 
Boston, London  
Wayne(headquarter), San 
Fran, Boston, Seattle, 
London, 
Andover MA(hq) 
California, Illinois,  
New York, UK 
Notable 
Exit 
Etoys,(12%) 
GOTO,(27%) 
CarsDirect(44%) 
Netzero(5%) 
VerticalNet( 9%) 
Breakaway 
Solution(49%)  
Chemdex(Ventro),9% 
Engage(ENGA) 82% 
NaviSite(NAVI) 72% 
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Table 2-5 Common Features and Differences of Three Incubators 
Idealab ICG CMGI 
Internal idea generation O  O 
Network synergy and market leader potential 
for deal criteria O O O 
Office space offered to portfolio firms O  O 
Collaboration among portfolio firms O O O 
Entrepreneurial experience of CEO O O O 
Direct control of portfolio firms   O 
Venture capital affiliation O  O 
Origin: Incubated by other incubator  O  
Focus on a specific Internet sector  O  
 
 
(1) Common Features  
 
In screening deals, the common criteria of the three incubators were market 
leadership potential and synergy or value to their network. Also the collaboration 
among portfolio firms are encouraged or arranged by the active role of incubator 
CEOs. Except for ICG, CMGI and Idealab have affiliated venture capital and 
directly manage the ir venture funds to invest in portfolio firms -- so that they can 
concentrate on coaching entrepreneurs instead of searching for funding sources. All 
three incubators provide an array of business support resources and services, but 
ICG doesn’t offer office space. Another distinguishing feature of these leading 
incubators is the fact that all three CEOs [Bill Gross(Idealab), David 
Wetherell(CMGI), and Walter Buckly(ICG)] have experiences in founding several 
venture firms before they started the incubator business. 
 
(2) Different Features 
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Equity Stake, Point of Intervention, Control 
Idealab mainly generates ideas internally and co-found venture firms with 
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs often come from inside the firm. After Idealab gets a 
company up and running, the ir equi ty stake is diluted through several liquidity 
events. eToys, an idea born by Bill Gross and Toby Lenk (former VP at Walt 
Disney), was launched by Idealab in 1997. However Idealab’s quickly absolved 
theire Toys board representation by the end of 1998;eToys therefore had more 
management control before their 1999 IPO. Idealab now holds a 12%equity share in 
eToys. 
ICG, in contrast, typically invests in later stages or into pre-IPO firms; by 
holding 20-50% equity stakes in portfolio firms, ICG maintains  significant influence 
over its investments. As of August 2000, ICG had 20-50% equity stakes in 73% of 
its portfolio firms.  
CMGI has a two -tier investment system; firms which are classified into 
operating firms with more than 50% of ownership, and firms which are invested 
through @Ventures fund with minority ownership. For operating firms, CMGI has 
strong control of its daily management. CEOs of operating firms have meetings 
every week in the CMGI headquarter17. CEOs of operating firms often either come 
from CMGI, or are recruited by CMGI. By contrast, @Ventures is operated like 
other venture capital. Concerning deal selection, on the other hand, network synergy 
is a critical screening criteria, and collaboration among portfolio companies are 
strategically encouraged. 
 
                                                                 
17En@ble,April 2000, 144. 
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Focus and Services 
Among the three incubators, ICG clearly states that its business focus is B2B 
e-business. ICG doesn’t offer physical office space to portfolio firms. That’s because 
ICG mainly invests in the later stage firms – or firms that do not require office space. 
Idealab’s business focus is on Internet business and interactive communications , 
while CMGI’s portfolio spans across the whole Internet business including B2C and 
B2B commerce and enablers.  
 
 
 
C M G I
Intervention stage
Significant Influence 
through equity stake
Involvement from
concept
Direct control of 
operating firm
IC G
Idealab
concept IPO
Figure 2-4 Point of Intervention and Type of Control  
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
under 20%     20-50%         over50% 
Figure2-3 Equity Stake Held  
Equity stake  
Percentage of portfolio firms  
ICG  
CMGI  
Idealab  
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3.  Classification of Business Models  
 
There are many different ways of running incubators, and niche players are 
entering the market. In this section, these different incubators are classified by the 
following criteria. 
 
(1) Classification by Organization Type 
 
1) Independent incubator 
Independent incubators are not affiliated to other organizations and are 
managed independently.  
 
Example: Idealab, eHatchery, Cambridge Incubators, CampSix 
 
2) Corporate Incubator 
Corporate incubators are similar to corporate venture capital in terms of 
organizational structure. In general, corporate incubators are subsidiaries of parent 
company or start a incubating program with outside venture capital or incubators. 
The corporate incubators’ goal is not capital gain on their equity investment, but 
future prospects of enhancing the existing business of parent companies.  
 
Example: 
 18 
 IBM-Conxion Dotcom(ISP) Incubator Program: provides technology and 
service at no cost for six months and gives venture firms the right to buy the product 
or walk away18 
Panasonic Internet Incubator, HP Garage Program 
Hotbank: Only incubates Softbank companies 
 
This strategy matches with research results about the corporate venture 
capital program. According to the study on corporate venture capital programs by 
Gompers and Lerner(1999)19, success depends on portfolio firms’ strategic fit with 
parent companies. 
 
3) Venture Capital Incubator 
Some of the established venture capital firms have their own incubating 
business.  
   
Example:  
Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers: incubates 20% of its funded companies in  
its facility.  
Benchmark Capital: there are usually two companies in its “seed program” at 
any given time20 
 
(2) Classification by Operation Model 
 
                                                                 
18 Lawren Aragon, and Julie Landry, “A-to-Z Guide to Incubators,” Red Herring, 19 Jan. 2000. 
19 Paul Gompers, and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (Cambridge, London: The MIT 
Press,1999).  
20 As Note 18 
 19 
1) Traditional Incubators 
Traditional incubators provide nearly all of the services that a venture needs 
including office space, HR, technology, money, network access, legal  help, 
accounting assistance, and the like .21 They intervene in the very early stage of firms -
- usually during the concept stage or business plan formulation stage.22 
 
Example: Idealab, eCompany , eHatchery, Cambridge Incubator 
 
2) Accelerators 
The concept of venture accelerator is used widely for firms that provide 
services for accelerating the growth of a new business 23  They don’t necessarily 
provide whole sets of services for a start-ups , but instead help a company start or 
develop a new business by leveraging the accelerators’ core competences. They 
participate in the seed or early stage of a company and emphasize speed to market in 
providing services. Oftentimes, they work with well established companies in 
developing new businesses, as in the Internet arena. In this category, the participation 
of incumbent consulting firms is notable. 
  
Example: @McKinsey, Antfactory, Intend Change, Reactivity 
 
 
 
                                                                 
21 Oonnut Mac Chinsombon, Incubators in the New Economy,MBA thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, June 2000. 
22 Joanne Lee, Christina Ma, Patrick Maloney, Victoria Martens, and Oswaldo Ramirez, Business 
Incubators: US vs. Europe, Hass School of Business , Univ. of California Berkley, June 2000. 
23 Joanne Lee, Christina Ma, Patrick Maloney, Victoria Martens, and Oswaldo Ramirez, Business 
Incubators: US vs. Europe, Hass School of Business , Univ. of California Berkley, June 2000. 
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3) Eco Net 
Eco Net24 -- the economic network -- is a term for incubator conglomerate. 
Traditional incubators like eCompany spin out invested firms as soon as the markets 
would have them. Eco Net retains control of start-ups after IPOs and network their 
companies together tightly -- yet the  control is looser than conglomerates.25  They 
work with companies at all stages of development and build and leverage synergies 
among portfolio companies.26 They are often strategic investors for the new venture as 
well as for other ventures within the firm, with service arms that create network 
synergies among these investments.27Incubating is part of their whole business and 
they are often holding companies or investment companies.  
 
Example: CMGI, ICG, Divine Interventures, Net Value Holdings 
 
  
 
 Stage of 
Intervention 
Services provided Emphasizing value 
Traditional Incubator Concept, Seed Full services Idea development 
Accelerator Later Part of services Speed 
EcoNet Whole stage 
Depending upon 
the intervention 
point 
Synergy 
 
 
                                                                 
24 Peter D. Henig, “And Now, ECONETS,” Red Herring, Feb. 2000. 
25 As Note 24. 
26Joanne Lee, Christina Ma, Patrick Maloney, Victoria Martens, and Oswaldo Ramirez, Business 
Incubators: US vs. Europe, Hass School of Business , Univ. of California Berkley, June 2000. 
 
27 Peter D. Henig, “And Now, ECONETS,” Red Herring, Feb. 2000. 
Table 2-5 Business Models by Operating Type 
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IV. Value Proposition  
 
According to a study by NBIA (National Business Incubation Association), 
the survival rates for incubated firms in the U.S are around 87%, while fewer than 
20% of startups survive their first three years of life28 . Even though this study 
includes both non-profit and for-profit incubators, and despite the fact that the 
survey was conducted before the surge of the new for-profit business incubators, the 
remarkably high survival rate can be an indicator of the value-added role of 
incubators. 
 
1. Value to Entrepreneurs  
 
(1) Capital  
 
Venture capital funds, which comprised 48% of all private equity capital 
raised in 1999, focus on the expansion stage of firms. In 1999, expansion stage 
investment accounted for 55% of all venture capital investment, while early stage 
investment represented only 22% of venture capital disbursement29. The average size 
of investment per firm was USD 13 million.30 
Given these facts, smaller scale e ntrepreneurs previously faced  difficulties in 
getting seed capital because venture capitalists prefer not to deal with smaller sums 
of money in highly uncertain firms. Incubators have filled this gap by funding these 
very early stage . This type of external funding sources has often been used as a  
                                                                 
28 Janet Rae-Dupree, “Company Closeup,” Business Week, 24 Aug. 1999. 
29 2000 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook. 
30 As Note 29. 
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strategic investment to enhance the synergy with the invested firms in their 
businesses. 
Incubators not only provide seed capital but also source venture capitalists to 
fund later rounds of financing.  
 
(2) Hands-on Management Coaching 
 
While venture capitalists supervise management through board 
representation, incubators are involved in daily management in a hands-on manner. 
Some incubators provide educational programs to fortify the entrepreneur’s 
knowledge and skills.31 This service is provided either through having management 
positions in incubated firms, or through board representation.  
 
(3) Network Synergy 
 
 Incubators facilitate the flow of knowledge and talents, and foster 
partnerships among incubates to generate network synergy 32 . The results are  
knowledge spillovers, economies of scale, and cost reductions on customer 
acquisitions, marketing, and sales. If firms share the same space or are located 
adjacent to each other, these advantages may be earned more easily. Even if little  
geographic proximity exists, the collaboration is orchestrated by incubators. In the 
                                                                 
31 Oonnut Mac Chinsombon, Incubators in the New Economy,MBA thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, June 2000. 
32 Morten Hasen, Henry Chesbrough, Nitin Nohria, and Donald Sull, “Networked 
Incubators:Hothouses of the New Economy,” Harvard Business Review, Sep-Oct. 2000. 
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case of Internet solution provider ` Breakaway solution’, for example,  nearly 18% of 
its revenue was generated from Internet Capital Group related companies in 1999.33 
  
(4) Speed 
 
Time to market is considered a critical success factor for the New Economy 
players. By having access to bundled business resources, incubators save the time 
which would have been otherwise used to contract such tasks individually.  
Incubators also accelerate the startup process through coaching and setting the right 
strategies.  
This is all made  possible based on the strength of the incubators inside 
resources: their ability to connect with outside resources, and their business expertise.  
 
(5)  Expertise 
 
By having operating experts on their advisory board or management , 
incubators can share knowledge  with several firms.  ICG have Coca-Cola's first chief 
marketing officer on its advisory board and offer such expertise to incubated firms in 
a hands-on manner.  
 
(6)  Idea Generation 
 
                                                                 
33 Breakaway Solution SEC Filing 10K, 31 March 2000.  
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Only 19% of incubators have an internal idea generation function in the 
survey by Chinsomboon.34 Incubators nevertheless help entrepreneurs develop their 
ideas into more marketable ones35. 
 
 
2. Value to Investors: Screening and Monitoring 
 
Venture capitalists, angel investors, institutional investors and public market 
investors are all capital providers of incubators. There are several ways in which  
Incubators’ benefit from  these investors. 
 
 Uncertainty and asymmetric information are the main factors limiting 
access to capital for potentially profitable firms36. Venture firms, which are in early 
stages of development, are associated with significantly high level of uncertaint ies 
about their potential outcomes. Entrepreneurs may know more about their firms’ 
prospects because they are involved in day-to-day management. 37  
Venture capitalists and other gatekeepers take the role of financial 
intermediaries to reduce these problems. The Incubators’ role as a financial 
intermediary contrasts in two aspects. First, incubators deal with even higher 
uncertainty because their involvement is at earlier stages than venture capitalists. 
This higher uncertainty also bears the potential of higher returns. The second 
                                                                 
34 Oonnut Mac Chinsombon, Incubators in the New Economy,MBA thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, June 2000. 
35 As note 34. 
36 Paul Gompers, and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (Cambridge, London: The MIT 
Press,,1999):129. 
37 As Note 36. 
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difference involves the higher degree of management influence as mentioned 
previously.  
 Incubators with a good reputation can reduce the problem of uncertainty and 
asymmetric information through their screening process in sourcing initial deals and 
their value-added services.  
 
 
V. Risks  
 
Despite the values that incubators deliver to entrepreneurs and investors, 
there are several r isks to be considered. 
 
1. Risks from its Business Model 
 
(1) Adverse Selection 
 
 Incubators may not be hold appeal for talented entrepreneurs with strong 
networks and clear business prospects. This type of entrepreneur may go directly to 
top-tier venture capital ists and give up less equity., Incubatees therefore are arguably   
less able firms at attracting  capital , and firms that lack convincing capabilities which 
stand on their own.  
 
(2) Adverse Development of Organization38 
 
                                                                 
38Oonnut Mac Chinsombon, Incubators in the New Economy,MBA thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, June 2000. 
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Failure records of entrepreneurs are considered an essential ground for future  
success due to the valuable lessons that such experiences give. Incubators 
supposedly reduce possible risks and problems that entrepreneurs can face, so 
venture firms may not breed the organizational ability to eliminate future threats. 
These are so-called “Mama’s Boys” problems.39  
   
(3) Grandstand Trap 
 
Most incubators are startups, too. To attract high-breed venture firms and 
resources, they need to establish a solid track record. Gompers and Lerners 
demonstrated that  young venture capital firms bring invested firms to the public 
market earlier than would the maximized returns on those individual companies, and 
that this early IPO incurs the cost of under-pricing 40 .This may be the same for  
young incubators as well;  in some cases they may be guilty of rushing to bring 
immature firms to the public market, or perhaps of selling firms for attractive prices 
to build their record, rather than coaching them to ensure their long-term growth. 
 
(4) Conflicts of Interests 
 
With several firms in their portfolio, incubators can use the knowledge  or 
intellectual property earned from one firm for other portfolio firms or for their own 
benefit. Yet entrepreneurs who don’t want to share their technology or ideas with 
                                                                 
39 Benjamin C.Powell, “Business Incubator and Internet Accelerator,” Redneck Tech, online, July 
2000. 
40 Paul Gompers, and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (Cambridge, London: The MIT 
Press,,1999):241. 
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other portfolio firms may have conflicts with an incubator who try to transfer 
knowledge spillover effects among portfolio firms.  
There are also other potential conflicts of interests between entrepreneurs and 
incubators. Incubators may invest in competitors of incumbent portfolio firms or a 
portfolio firm may make an alliance with other firms of competing incubators. In 
addition to this, another problem arises: portfolio firms’ strategic decisions may not 
benefit the incubator. In March of 1999, for example, Lycos announced its plan of 
merging with USA Networks (a media company). Possessing a 20% stake in Lycos, 
David Wetherell -- CEO of CMGI -- resigned from Lycos’ board in order to protest 
the deal, claiming that the deal was undervalued. Lycos nevertheless supported the 
deal, but two months  later the deal was cancelled due to the expected rejection of its 
shareholders.  
 
(5) Interconnection Trap 
 
Due to the efforts by incubators to encourage collaboration among portfolio 
firms, portfolio firms oftentimes are connected with each other through co-marketing, 
sales, equity sharing, and so on. In one such case almost 18% of Breakaway 
Solution’s revenue came from ICG communities. While this interconnection bears 
synergy effects, it also leaves the incubator vulnerable to negative domino  effects as 
well, with the possibility of one portfolio’s boom-bust cycle wreaking havoc on 
others.  
 
2. Risk from the External Environment 
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(1) Regulations 
 
Some view the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a barrier for incubators 
that want to go public themselves. According to this law, a firm with more than 40% 
of its asset in investment securities41 is declared a investment company, and must 
operate under far stricter sets of regulations and reporting requirements.42  
Given this environment, incubators are encour aged to maintain a certain level 
of investment in majority owned companies. Under this law, CMGI is classified as 
an operating company; ICG also obtained an exemption period claiming that its 
strategy and active role in its portfolio companies constitutes an operating status .43 
Idealab also wants to go public and filed for an IPO, but this regulation is an obstacle 
that Idealab needs to overcome. Even after an IPO, however, incubators should try to 
maintain this level of investment . This in turn may cause unfavorable portfolio 
compositions.  
 
(2) Stock Market Volatility 
 
The incubator business is very sensitive to public market conditions. The 
profit of incubators mainly comes from trading, selling, and issuing of equities of 
portfolio firms. Uncertain valuation of the equity stake of portfolio firms causes 
volatile profit streams of incubators.  
 
                                                                 
41 Investment securities include all securities except (A) government securities, (B) securities issued 
by employees' securities companies, and (C) securities issued by majority-owned subsidiaries of the 
owner which are not investment companies 
Investment Company Act of 1940, FDIC Law, Regulations, Related Acts 
42 Peter D. Henig, “And Now, ECONETS,” Red Herring, Feb. 2000. 
43 Stephanie Gates, “ ICG is risky business,” Red Herring, Aug. 1999. 
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The following figure (figure 2-5) is a comparison of incubators and venture 
capital firms in terms of relative values and risks. One may note that while 
incubators provide value-added services other than capital, the risks borne to them 
are higher than those that exist with venture capital.  
 
Figure 2-5 Values and Risks of Incubators Compared with Venture Capital 
Firms 
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VI.  Key Success Factors 
  
 Figure 2-6 illustrates the factors that influence values and risks  of incubators. 
Based on these factors, some of the key values drivers  that can decrease risks  have 
been identified. 
Figure 2-6 Key Success Factors of Incubators 
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1. Strategic Deal Selection : Leadership Potential, Synergy 
 
To avoid adverse selection and achieve synergy effects among portfolio 
companies, incubators need to base their deal evaluation criteria on its industry 
leadership potential and network synergy.  
This factor was mentioned in previous studies on technology incubators. The 
OECD study on technology incubators (1997) reported that unlike the prevailing 
practice of over-emphasizing the potential for future success in recruitment decisions, 
technology incubators need to base entry and service decisions on “needs” and “fit” 
rather than on the success potential only.44 
 
2. Encouraging Collaboration 
 
Collaboration cannot be achieved by merely sharing the same physical 
facility or brand name of an incubator. The active role of the incubator is critical in 
encouraging collaboration. Bill Gross of Idealab stimulates CEOs of its portfolio 
firms to collaborate in various aspects. Since the drive to develop their own business 
model overrides collaboration efforts and minimizes the benefits of s haring the same 
physical space, portfolio firms need to be spurred on by incubators in the exchange 
of ideas.  
 
 
3. Talents, Network for Resources 
                                                                 
44 Sarfraz A. Mian, “Evaluating the Impact of Technology Incubators,” Technology Incubators: 
Nurturing Small Firms, OECD, 1997, 61. 
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For speed, operational expertise, and idea generation, talents and network for 
sourcing outside resources are the key ingredients. The CEOs of Idealab, ICG, and 
CMGI all have the experience of founding ventures. Experienced directors are in 
their management team as well. Recruiting and appropriately compensating capable 
management is one of the most important decisions that the incubators make, 
because the depth of their experience translates into faster and better execution of  
business plans.45  
Prominent talents and networks can also decrease the risk of adverse 
selection.  
 
4. Resources Devoted to Direct Client Coaching 
 
The management resources of incubators should be used first and foremost to 
provide client assistance.46Studies and reports done before the rage of new for-profit 
incubators reveals that the time spent in direct client contact by the incubator 
managers is by far the most significant  factor for success.  Concerns which distract 
incubator directors from time spent with clients -- such as facility management, 
funding, and stakeholder issues -- jeopardize the success of tenant firms.47 
This is true of new incubators as well. Recent studies on Internet incubators 
reveal that coaching is one of the most important benefits that can differentiate the 
incubator business model from other service providers such as venture capital.  
                                                                 
45Oonnut Mac Chinsombon, Incubators in the New Economy, MBA thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, June 2000. 
46 OECD, Business Incubation: International Case Studies(Paris: OECD, 1999): 162. 
47 OECD, Business Incubation: International Case Studies(Paris: OECD, 1999): 146. 
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Resources including time, knowledge , and expertise allocated to direct contacts are 
critical factors in delivering hands-on coaching service.  
 
5. Supporting, Not Doing the Work for Them 
 
To avoid poorly developed organizations, incubators need to support and 
develop the entrepreneur’s ability to achieve their own goals, rather than do the work 
for them.48 Incubators should not provide financial aid but also educate the tenant 
firm ; ideally, create an environment for entrepreneurs to aggressively pursue their 
goals with some amounts of  hardships entailed.  
 
6. Proper Performance Assessment and Monitoring Programs 
 
Performance assessment and monitoring programs reduce the risk of moral 
hazard and poorly developed organizations. Incubators are in a better position to 
monitor (than venture capitalists) since its services provide hands-on coaching. 
Nonetheless, due to the very nature of incubators in which moral hazard problems 
arise, entrepreneurs may be more exposed to risks; without proper performance 
assessment and monitoring programs, incubators could expose their tenant firms to 
“Moma’s Boys” 49 problems.  
 
7. Strategic Portfolio Compositions 
 
                                                                 
48 OECD, Business Incubation: International Case Studies(Paris: OECD, 1999): 163. 
49 Benjamin C.Powell, “Business Incubator and Internet Accelerator,” Redneck Tech, online, July 
2000. 
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Given stock market volatility, grandstand traps and interconnection traps 
require incubators to balance their strategic portfolio compositions. Defined as firms 
that are well-established in the public market or a later stage of  stable profit streams, 
anchor firms can add stability to the portfolio.50 Secondly, in order to satisfy short 
term capital  needs , incubators have firms to liquidate in their portfolio.51While this 
may not be a favorable way to sustain an incubating model, new incubators may be 
able to prove their liquidity and reputation by keeping a portion of their portfolio in 
this category.  And lastly, incubators should create flexible networks to avoid the 
interconnection trap. Revenue sources, customer sources, as well as marketing 
activities should not be overly nor exclusively concentrated on inside networks. 
Equity sharing and collaboration among portfolio firms should be based on 
sophisticated schemes orchestrated by an incubator. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
50 OECD, Business Incubation: International Case Studies(Paris: OECD, 1999):155. 
51 Oonnut Mac Chinsombon, Incubators in the New Economy, MBA thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, June 2000. 
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Chapter III 
BUSINESS INCUBATORS IN KOREA 
 
 
I. The Incubator Industry in Korea 
 
1. History 
 
In the early 1990s, the Korean government  enacted a lot to establish business 
incubators with the hopes of decentralizing knowledge and technology away from 
the major conglomerates and to support small-and-medium-sized companies. In 
1992, the government assigned the SME Industry Promotion Corporation and 
JoongBoo Industry Consulting to run business incubators. Soon, Technology 
Business Incubator was established in KAIST in 1994. Although By 1996 there were 
only 10 business incubators in Korea,52 this number has rapidly increased to 226 
according to a May 2000 report from the SMBA(Small and Medium Business 
Association. These designated incubators, one should note, are non-profit incubators 
which have academic links to universities, research centers and communities.  
The first for-profit business incubator in Korea was Miralab 
(www.miralab.com). This Internet business incubator was established in 1999 by six 
Korean-Americans who moved back to Korea; the initial seed money was a W 30 
billion investment from a U.S based fund.53 CEO Lee Jung Suck was in charge of 
software development at Chase Manhattan prior to founding MiraLab. They 
benchmarked the business model of eBay and incubated WaaWaa.com in Korea and 
                                                                 
52 Ryoo, JaeWon, Improving the Management of Business Incubators- Seoul Business Incubator Case, 
Hanyang Univ. Dec. 1996, 15. 
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WeiWei.com.hk in Hong Kong. Since then the participants of new for-profit 
business incubators has increased dramatically54 , and now established venture firms 
and off line corporations actively participate in the incubating business.  
 
2. Key Players 
 
Many service firms declare that they are incubators, but many of them 
provide a limited array of services. Table 3-1 shows the list of for-profit incubators 
in Korea. 
Similar to the U.S. experience, various types of incubators including 
traditional incubators, accelerators, and eco-nets are currently emerging in Korea. By 
leveraging their high stock prices, venture firms and firms registered with KOSDAQ 
have entered the incubator market. Large corporations, as well, have begun 
incubating businesses to capture the New Economy opportunities. Samsung 
Corporation, for example, started a corporate venture progr am to nurture and expand 
its Internet business.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
53 JoongAng Daily, 1 Sep.1999. 
54 IT Chosun reported that the number of incubators was 120 in May 2000. 
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Table 3-1 Lists of Incubators in Korea 
 Company Focus 
 
Background 
of CEO  
Incubatees Operating 
Model 
Miralab.com 
(Mar 1999) 
Internet 
business 
 
 
Lee, 
Jungsuck(33) 
-Chase 
Manhattan 
WaaWaa.com 
Pricekiss.com.hk 
WeiWei.com 
Stocknote.com 
 
Incubator 
(Internal 
idea 
generation) 
MA coms 
(1997) 
IT ventures Originated 
from MA 
technology 
ENET  
 
Accelerator 
BnC asia 
(Mar 2000) 
Internet 
Business 
Kim, Soyun 
-Hansol 
telecome 
10 Internet 
technology 
firmsand portals 
Incubator 
Ebizholdings 
(Jan 2000) 
Internet 
Business 
Jin Samhyun 
- PhD. 
Engineering 
Infrastructure, 
commerce  
13 firms 
Econet 
Labinvest 
(2000) 
Technology 
lab 
Ji Gyuhwan 
-Research 
fellow in 
Congress 
 Incubator 
Momus 
ventures 
(2000) 
B2B e-
business 
Choi 
Hokyun 
-Goldman 
Sachs 
Be.md.com 
(medical 
equipment 
commerce site) 
Accelerator 
Jinsol 
Internet 
(1998) 
Offline 
firms’ e-
business 
Joo Jinyong IT, education, 
logistics, 
commerce firms 
Accelerator 
Ideaplaza 
(May 1999) 
Patent-
based 
technology
ventures 
 JeJeworld, 
Inch21 
Itsbe 
Mmline, 
offspace  
Incubator 
Nshaper 
(April 2000) 
e-business Kim 
Youngsung 
- Mckinsey  
 Econet 
Softbank 
N platform 
(Mar 2000) 
B2B e-
commerce 
Ma Sangjoon 
-Mckinsey 
  
Independent 
Etriz,Intizen,  
 
BI-bank 
(Jan 2000) 
e-business e-corporation 
Paxnet  
Joint venture 
 Incubator Corporate 
Goldbank, Serom technology, Samsung goldengate, Daum, LG capital. 
Makyung IBI.DongBoo group 
 
KVC net 
(June 1999) 
 e-business Yoo, 
Wonhee 
-KTIC 
 Econet Venture 
Capital 
@팩스 venture partners 
Mirae asset ventures 
KTB incubating 
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3. Government Policy on Non-Profit Business Incubators 
 
 If one compares the 226 designated non-profit incubators as of August 2000 
with the figure of 800 incubators in North America -- including for-profit and non-
profit incubators -- it becomes apparent that Korea is nurturing a large number of 
non-profit incubators. 
           SMBA announced in March 2000 that it would provide  up to W 700 million 
to each eligible incubator. 
 
Table 3 -2 Korean Venture and Incubators Designated by SMBA by Locations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SMBA 
  
  SMBA has encouraged incubator development in the non-capital region area. 
Table 3-2 shows the low non-profit incubators portion in the Seoul, Kyunggi, and 
Region 
Number of 
venture firms (%) 
Number of non-
profit incubators (%) 
Seoul 2,399 4 0 % 31 1 4 %
Pusan Woolsan 372 6% 19 8%
Daekoo Kyungbook 350 6% 25 11%
Kwangjoo Junnam 161 3% 23 10%
DaejunChungnam 454 8% 31 14%
Kyunggi  1,305 2 2 % 35 1 5 %
Inchon 406 7 % 5 2 %
Kanwon 54 1% 13 6%
Chungbook 158 3% 13 6%
Junbook 91 2% 13 6%
Kyungnam 241 4% 16 7%
Cheju 13 0.2% 2 1%
Total 6,004 100.0% 226 100%
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Inchon areas; in the remaining regions , the portion of non-profit incubators is higher 
than the portion of venture firms. 
  
4. Alliance with Global Players 
 
Global players started to enter the Korean market by investing in Korean 
venture firms or making strategic alliances with Korean partners.  
KTB, Korea’s largest venture capital company, established their own  
incubating division in July 2000 ( www. ktbi.co.kr ), with  US incubator Techpharm, 
Compaq, and Silicon Valley Bancshares. 
 
 
II. Comparison with the US business model  
 
1. Participating Business  
 
Even though Korean incubators are in the earlier stage relative to their US 
counterparts, they tend to focus on specific areas such as B2B upstarts, software, and 
online solution models for offline companies. This phenomenon can be explained by 
Korea’s late start; by the time that Korean incubators evolved, the first wave of 
Internet start-ups had passed and the sustainability of many Internet business models 
were already called into question by many analysts and industry experts. New 
players have, therefore, tried to focus on more specific areas rather than embrace the 
whole Internet business domain.  
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2. Sponsors: Big Corporations, Ventures 
 
Big corporations and ventures with excess cash are starting incubating 
businesses. However this is different from Panasonic, IBM, or Hotbank incubators 
which focus on synergy effects between incubatees and their original business. Big   
corporations in Korea are using the incubating business model to expand their 
business online -- and often into new business areas. Venture companies are trying to 
utilize their excess cash by investing in other venture firms. While Panasonic and 
IBM programs have clear strategic focus, Korean corporate incubators are inclined 
to look for investment opportunities in diverse areas. 
 
3. CEO Backgrounds 
 
While many US incubators’ CEOs have experience in founding ventures 
themselves, founders or CEOs of Korean incubators rarely have entrepreneurial 
experience. Consultants from multi-national consulting firm or investment firms are 
actively entering the incubating bus iness leveraging their global network and 
expertise. This can be partly explained by the underdevelopment of SME businesses 
in Korea.  In short, Korean incubators have accumulated less SME entrepreneurial 
experience and expertise relative to the U.S.  
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III. Implications for the Korean Incubator Industry 
 
1. Supplementing the Weak Role of Venture Capitalists’  
 
Korean incubators have more potential due to the weak venture capitalists’ 
role. Korean venture capitalists have different aspects in terms of capital size, value 
added service and certification roles.  
The size of venture capital is smaller than other countries that have well 
developed venture capital. The ratio of Korean venture capital size per GDP is 
0.30% while the U.S is 2.10% and Taiwan is 3.91%. Therefore the incubators’ role 
as a capital provider and venture catalyst becomes more relevant. Ensuring networks 
with private equity capital providers and obtaining stable funding sources is very 
crucial. 
  
Table 3-3 Venture Capital Portion of GDP (1998) 
 The U.S Taiwan Korea Japan Singapore 
VC/GDP(%) 2.10 3.91 0.30 0.29 0.21 
Source: SMBA 
 
Korean venture capitalists role as value-added service provider is not 
significant due to their short history and lack of talents. Operating expertise business 
partnership networks cannot be acquired by obtaining venture capital investment. In 
light of these factors the incubator model – which provides active management 
participation and business model development – can be seen as highly attractive. 
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  According to several studies55, Korean venture capitalists’ certification role56 
at the time of IPO is very weak. This means that Korean venture capitalists held little 
sway in their role of monitoring and reducing asymmetric information problems of 
venture firms. Once again the incubators’ role of monitoring the management and 
screening promising venture firms seems to offer solutions to some of these issues.  
  
 Given the  weak roles of venture capitalists have provided, and since they  
have not provided sufficient managerial and financial support to entrepreneurs, 
promising entrepreneurs may very well seek incubators to get those value-added 
services. 
 
2. Nurturing Entrepreneurial Experiences and Incorporating Operating 
Expertise 
  
Since both Korean incubators and venture capitalists lack entrepreneurial 
experience, it is unlikely that they can deliver sufficient operating expertise and 
hands-on coaching services. Incubators should nurture entrepreneurial experience 
through active management participation; furthermore they will need to recruit 
experienced persons to infuse corporate operating expertise into their organizations. 
 
 3. Strategic Fit and Needs in Incubating Programs of Big Corporations and 
Ventures 
  
                                                                 
55 Kang MoonSoo, The study on VC’s certification role in IPO, Seoul National Univ. Feb. 1998. 
Hoe Young Soon, The study on VC’s certification role in IPO,Korea Univ. June 1999. 
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 Big corporations and venture firms that are entering the incubator business 
should select portfolio firms according to their strategic fits and needs, not for 
utilizing their excess cash and maximizing investing profit. With strategic fit with 
portfolio firms, corporate incubators can utilize their expertise and expe rience not 
only in incubating but also in selecting promising candidates. The high success rate 
of corporate venture capital with strategic fit and low success rate of corporate 
venture capital without strategic fit were proven in many studies on corporate 
venture capital program.57 Several incubators in the U.S incorporated this lesson to 
their business model. Panasonic, IBM, and HP enhance their product sales and 
acquire knowledge from their incubating programs.  
 Corporate incubators in Korea should have strategic fit as critical criteria for 
selecting their portfolio firms rather than merely divesting excess cash through  
diversified portfolios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
56 Certification Role: Venture capitalists reduce asymmetric information problem between issuing 
firms and outside investors. Therefore the level of underpricing at the time of IPO may be smaller for 
venture capital backed firm due to the certification role of venture capital. 
57 Paul Gompers, and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle (Cambridge, London: The MIT 
Press,,1999) 
 44 
Chapter IV 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
 Business incubators deliver various compelling benefits, yet contain various 
intrinsic risks. The whole array of services for entrepreneurs addresses the need for 
speed to market and ensuring superior talents. Their idea generation function is 
another lubricant to accelerate the entrepreneurial drive. Their network is more 
flexible than traditional keiretsu and, at the same time, generates compatible synergy 
and scale effects. The hands-on coaching places incubators in a better position to 
monitor the entrepreneur’s practice. There are, however, many risk factors such as 
adverse selection, poorly developed organizations, interconnection traps, and 
vulnerability to volatile stock markets.  
 Korean incubators have a lot of potential to grow, but  also face risks that 
stem from lack of entrepreneurial experience and insufficient capital, and a highly 
volatile stock market. One distinguishing feature of the Korean market is the 
participation of big corporations in venture capital and incubators, as well as acting 
on the behalf of investors and clients of incubators. Given the overwhelming 
presence of Chaebols, it is no wonder that many Korean incubators focus on 
businesses with these established firms rather than encouraging the entrepreneurial 
drive. Chaebols also attempt to use incubating businesses as another diversification 
tool without strategic fit with their core businesses. The Korean incubating business 
industry is at an even earlier stage than in the U.S. and have the chance to learn 
lessons from the past.According to a Harvard Business School survey, 16% of 
incubated firms were acquired by other firms or went public, while only 38% of 
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interviewed incubators have graduated firms. This implies that the new business 
incubators are in the early stages of development and it’s too early to judge their 
success. However as more and more incubator businesses mature and go public, the 
valuation of incubators may become a controversial  issue. Valuation of incubators is 
a  complex process,  based on  the portfolio firms, operating revenues,  cash on hand, 
the value of public and portfolios, and future value creation. These factors are much 
more complicated to measure than other business models. This issue should be 
examined in further studies. 
 Another issue for further study is the globalization of incubating businesses. 
Scalability across multiple countries, managing the risks of international portfolios, 
and network effects are some of the issues that will need to be addressed in the 
future. 
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